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Abstract—Risk Assessment has been identified as a critical 
issue in computer infrastructures, especially in medium to large 
scale organizations and enterprises. The goal of this research 
report is to provide a virtual machine based framework for 
testing the performance of vulnerability scanners applied to such 
enterprises, focused to small and medium size ones. Moreover, 
the purpose of this paper is to compare three of the most well-
known free vulnerability scanning solutions (Nessus, OpenVAS, 
Nmap Scripting Engine) in regards to how they can be used to 
automate the process of Risk Assessment in an organization, 
based on the herein presented experimental evaluation 
framework involving virtual machine testing.  
Keywords—Vulnerability Scanning, Risk Assessment, Nessus, 
OpenVAS, Nmap Scripting Engine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A vulnerability scanner is a software application that assesses 
security vulnerabilities in networks or host systems and 
produces a set of scan results. Those vulnerabilities can be 
software bugs and backdoors, missing OS patches, insecure 
configurations and vulnerable ports and services.  
It allows early detection of known security problems but by 
itself it isn’t the perfect solution for the protection of the 
network because it can only provide a snapshot of the state of 
the security of a network when each scan is concluded. 
Furthermore, the scan results can be overwhelming on large 
networks and human judgment is needed while reading the 
results to separate true vulnerabilities from false positives. 
Finally, vulnerability scanners operate by using plugins that 
discover known vulnerabilities only which can lead to false 
negatives due to missing plugins or 0-day exploits. [1] 
The data that vulnerability scanners produce, especially on 
bigger networks can be overwhelming and it can be difficult to 
determine the overall security state of a network or a cluster of 
it that is deemed more important. A way to aggregate the 
results of vulnerability scanning to produce an overall report 
for the security of the system would be very useful to the 
security specialists to monitor the state of the network and 
where, as well as the priority of actions that need to be taken. 
While this would be a very good first step to help the security 
specialists in allocating time and resources more efficiently in 
securing the network a further step could be taken to help them 
be one step ahead of the attackers, taking into account 
temporal aspects and dynamic properties of vulnerabilities to 
create a stochastic model that can “predict the future” by 
anticipating security gaps on the network that an attacker 
would aim to exploit and optimizing resource allocation to 
ensure the efficient protection of key business assets. 
The aim of this report is to analyze the available vulnerability 
scanners and decide who would be the ideal as the base to 
create such a stochastic model and based on its features how 
this could potentially be achieved. Although, there are other 
attempts in the literature ([3], [4], [5]) to provide assessments 
of vulnerability scanners based on their features and 
characteristics, offering relevant comparison frameworks, the 
contribution of this paper lies in the provision of a suitable 
evaluation framework towards emulating business 
environment risk assessment. It is based on virtual machine 
testing and focuses on emulating the business environment of 
a small to medium size enterprise. 
II. THE VULNERABILITY SCANNERS AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS 
In general, the Vulnerability scanners consist of four main 
modules: the user interface, the scan engine, the vulnerability 
database and a report module.   
  
Fig. 1. Vulnerability scanner architecture 
There are lots of Vulnerability scanners, some of them are free 
and Open Source (or have a free version with limitations) 
while others can be very expensive. For our purposes, the 
main requirement is being able to create custom tests and 
custom reports by combing the results with our own metrics 
and formulas to produce a summary of the total security of the 
network. Alternatively, the reports should be able to be 
exported in a way that the data is retrievable by an external 
program if we want to perform the generation of the overall 
security mark and the proposed stochastic model externally.  
 
In Figure 2 we present the two proposed solutions on how a 
Vulnerability scanner could be used to produce an overall 
security mark for the network. The blue colored shapes are 
unmodified modules of the vulnerability scanner while the 
gray shapes are where we would have to create custom code.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Using a Vulnerability scanner to produce an overall security mark 
In order to aggregate the data produced by the vulnerability 
scanner we have two options. 
 
The first option (Option A) is to do the aggregation of the 
results and the production of a final report within the scanner 
environment which would require the scanner to give us the 
ability to produce custom reports with scripting that allows the 
execution of functions that use the scan data and produce 
custom text.  
 
Option B would take the raw data from the Vulnerability 
Scanner’s default report and import it into another software 
that would then process it to produce our final assessment of 
the overall security of the network. This would require the data 
of the report produced by the scanner to be structured in a way 
that’s easily exportable and comprehensible by other software. 
 
Ideally the chosen Vulnerability Scanner would provide both 
of these options. For this reason, the Vulnerability scanners 
we’ll be examining are going to be mainly Open Source and 
free with the exception of Nessus that used to be Open Source 
and is still one of the most widely used and well documented 
Vulnerability scanners.  
A. Nessus 
Nessus has been one of the most popular Vulnerability 
Scanners mainly due to the fact that it initially was Open 
Source and Free up until 2005 where they closed the source 
code in 2005 and removed the free version in 2008. There is a 
free “Nessus Home” version but it is only available for 
personal use in a home environment and it has a few 
limitations like only allowing the scanning of 16 IPs per 
scanner. It has an extensive vulnerability database that is 
updated on a daily basis with over 90.000 different plugins at 
this point and is available for Windows (Server and 7, 8, 10), 
various Linux Distributions and FreeBSD. 
 
Nessus will be the standard that we compare the other 
vulnerability scanners. Most of its features (client/host 
architecture, smart service recognition, and CVE 
compatibility) should be expected from the other vulnerability 
scanner solutions too and its vulnerability/plugin database 
numbers is a good sample of what we should be looking for on 
a good vulnerability scanner. The most important aspect 
though that makes Nessus a good solution and the standard of 
comparison is the existence of the Nessus Attack Scripting 
Language. We will look further in NASL and its custom 
scripts in another section and any other scanner that could be 
considered should provide a similar ability to create custom 
tests and reports.  
B. OpenVAS  
OpenVAS is the free, open source Vulnerability scanner that 
forked from the GPL version of Nessus (Version 2) after it 
went proprietary in 2005. What is important for our purposes 
is that OpenVAS plugins are still written in Nessus Attack 
Scripting Language (NASL). The actual security scanner is 
accompanied with a regularly updated feed of Network 
Vulnerability Tests (NVTs), over 50,000 in total. All 
OpenVAS products are Free Software. Most components are 
licensed under the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL).” 
 
It being open source and free while using NASL makes it a 
great alternative for our purposes. 
C. Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) 
Nmap (Network Mapper) is a free and open source utility for 
network discovery and security auditing that is considered one 
of the most popular security tools due to its flexibility, power, 
portability and ease of use. It runs on all major computer 
Operating Systems and official binary packages are available 
for Linux, Windows and Mac OS X. The Nmap Scripting 
Engine (NSE) allows users to write their own scripts to 
automate a wide variety of networking tasks through Nmap. 
 
Even though NSE isn’t a comprehensive vulnerability scanner 
(the number of available scripts for NSE is nowhere near those 
for Nessus and OpenVAS with about 600 scripts available at 
the time of writing this), the vulnerability exploitation 
capabilities of NSE, its integration with the rest of the libraries 
and tools of the Nmap suite, and the simple interface that the 
“vuln” NSE library provides to create well-organized 
vulnerability reports that can also contain CVE references can 
be proven very useful for our purposes. 
 
 III. VIRTUAL MACHINE TESTING 
In order to test the scanners a virtual machine network was 
created. While Nessus and NSE can be run in a Windows 
environment, OpenVAS server requires a Unix Operating 
system. For this reason the initial testing environment 
consisted of four virtual machines to represent a small 
business network (a Windows 10 workstation, a windows 7 
workstation, an Windows 2012 server and an Ubuntu server) 
as well as two vulnerability scanning machines, one for   the 
Nessus/NSE server (Windows 7) and the other for the 
OpenVAS server (Kali Linux) For this particular comparison 
the free Oracle VirtualBox Environment was used to create 
these 6 machines with a NAT network setup so they can 
connect to each other as well as the internet. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Virtual Machines setup for testing the Vulnerability Scanners 
Overall the easiest vulnerability scanner to setup, use and add 
custom scripts was NSE by installing the Zenmap GUI in a 
Windows environment along with Nmap. The Nessus server 
was easier to setup (as there is a windows installation) but the 
fact that both scanners can be run from a web interface from 
any kind of OS as long as it can connect to the server makes 
this a non-issue on a business environment.  
 
By performing the vulnerability scanning with each scanner on 
the test network the results showed that the scanners are not 
that far in comparison with each one having different pros and 
cons. 
 
NSE was the fastest by completing the scan of the whole 
network in 10 minutes while Nessus took twice this time and 
OpenVAS took 1 hour and 20 minutes. Nessus found the most 
vulnerabilities by finding three Critical vulnerabilities when 
OpenVAS and NSE both found the same two. Presentation 
and options wise Nessus and OpenVAS are similar with 
Nessus having a slight edge while NSE is more barebones than 






















IV. KNOWLEDGE BASE COMPARISON 
While presentation and the provided features are very 
important for any kind of software the quality of the 
Knowledge Base is arguably the most important aspect of any 
Vulnerability scanner. And while speed, reliability and the 
quality of the plugins is important the number of 
vulnerabilities covered is what provides the most coverage 
against attacks. The vendors usually mention the number of 
plugins or checks when they are talking about their knowledge 
base but since a single plugin can refer to a number of 
vulnerabilities a more realistic way to figure out how many 
different vulnerabilities are covered is to check the CVE links 
included in their Knowledge base. 
 
To perform this we used the plugin databases for Nessus, 
OpenVAS and Nmap that can be freely downloaded from 
Vulners.com. In order to process the vulnerability Knowledge 
Base for each scanner we used the Python scripting language 
to extract the unique CVEs that each database covers and 
placed them in sets (which are unordered lists in Python that 
contain unique objects). From these sets we extracted the 
following information about how many unique Vulnerabilities 
each database covers. 
TABLE I.  UNIQUE VULNERABILITIES COVERED 
Vulnerability Scanner  Unique CVEs  




Comparing the Knowledge bases we can see that Nessus 
covers more than 5000 different vulnerabilities than OpenVAS 
while the Nmap scripting engine only covers a total of 67 
different Vulnerabilities which is to be expected from the 
much lower number of scripts it has available for vulnerability 
scanning.  
 
Even though one database contains more CVEs than the other 
it doesn’t mean it includes all the CVEs that the smaller 
database contains. Using the created sets of unique CVEs we 
used another operation of Python sets “.difference” which 
compares two sets and returns a new set with elements that 
exist in the first but not the second. 
 














Fig. 4. Unique CVEs on each database 
Even though Nessus covers 5,566 more unique vulnerabilities 
than OpenVAS while comparing the two the Nessus database 
contains 10,760 CVEs that the one of OpenVAS doesn’t. As a 
result OpenVAS covers 5,194 vulnerabilities that Nessus 
doesn’t. This means that even though OpenVAS covers less 
CVEs there might be some vulnerabilities that will be detected 
by OpenVAS but not Nessus. Even Nmap that covers a much 
smaller number of vulnerabilities than both of the other tools 
could potentially detect 4 and 8 vulnerabilities that Nessus or 
OpenVAS respectively would not. 
Looking at the overall number of existing CVE IDs (93324) 
even the numbers of Nessus and OpenVAS seem small but in 
reality the CVEs that they are not detected at this point by a 
scanner could just be that they are old or very specific to 
certain software or devices and due to these reasons the 
differences on the Nessus and OpenVAS databases can be 
much smaller that it seems.  
 
V. PERFORMING A RISK ASSESSMENT 
In order to assess the usefulness of each scanner in evaluating 
the overall relative security of a network it is important to 
define what the requirements for such a risk assessment are. 
Then we need to investigate what data we can get from these 
vulnerability scanners and how we can use it to perform a Risk 
Assessment of the system.  According to the NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) Risk Management 
Guide for Information Technology Systems “Risk is a function 
of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a 
particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of 
that adverse event on the organization”. [2] 
 
The Risk Assessment Methodology can be described in 9 steps 
and in the following section we’ll be examining how the three 
vulnerability scanners we are comparing (Nessus, OpenVAS 
and NSE) can be used to gather and present information in 
regards to each of these steps. 
 
Step 1. System Characterization 
The first step before starting to assess risk of a system is to 
collect system related information like Hardware, Software, 
Interfaces, Topology, Data and Information, and the People 
that use and support the system as well as the System mission 
(the purpose of the system and the processes that are 
performed by it).  
 
There is also information used to determine the actual risk 
value in relation to the data like System and data criticality 
(the value of the data) as well as the System and data 
sensitivity (the level of protection required to maintain the 
system and data integrity, confidentiality and availability). 
Some of this information cannot be gathered by an automated 
computer software on an unknown system like the information 
on the people that use the system, its purpose and the 
criticality and sensitivity of data. The recommended 
techniques to gather this information are through human 
interaction (Questionnaires and Interviews) as well as 
Document Reviews and could vary on different systems and 
organizations but still in a proposed software solution that uses 
online questionnaires or other data gathering techniques this 
information could be parsed directly to the software through a 
standardized interface. 
 
What can be performed by an automated scanning tool and is 
in fact mostly performed by using one of those (network 
mappers) is identifying the hosts and the services that they are 
running on the system.  All three of the tools can be used for 
Host and Service Discovery and this information is presented 
on their final reports. 
 
Step 2. Threat Identification 
Threat is described as the potential for a particular threat-
source to successfully exploit a vulnerability in a way that can 
harm the system. [2] 
Even though sources and motivation for their threat actions 
cannot be identified by a vulnerability scanner and should be 
investigated specifically for each organization and its data by 
the management and the IT professionals, knowing what 
vulnerabilities exist and where in the system can provide with 
an indication of who could potentially seek to exploit them 
and what would be their motivation. 
 
Step 3. Vulnerability identification 
Vulnerability is described as a flaw or weakness in system 
security procedures that could be exercised and result in a 
security breach or violation of the system’s security policy. [2] 
 
Again in the larger scope of an organization this could include 
the physical and environmental security of the IT system as 
well as the personnel that are out of the scope of vulnerability 
scanning software but what they can definitely be used for 
(and is as expected their main use in IT security), is to identify 
software vulnerabilities in the system like known vulnerable 
services, missing patches and dangerous configurations that 
could be exercised by the potential threat-sources. 
 
Step 4. Control Analysis 
This step is about analyzing the controls that exist or are 
planned to minimize the probability of a threat-source 
exercising a system vulnerability.  These controls can be 
Preventive that prevent attempts to violate security (firewalls, 
encryption, and authentication) or Detective that warn of 
violations or attempted violations of the security measures. 
 
The vulnerability scanners can be can be used to notify on the 
absence of these types of technical controls. 
 
Step 5. Likelihood Determination 
A likelihood rating indicates the probability that a 
vulnerability may be exercised by a threat-source and 
 according to NIST it can be categorized into three likelihood 
levels. [2] 
TABLE II.  LIKELIHOOD DETERMINATION 
Likelihood 
Level Likelihood Definition  
High 
The threat-source is highly motivated and 
sufficiently capable, and controls  to prevent the 
vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective 
Medium 
The threat-source is motivated and capable, but 
controls are in place that may impede successful 
exercise of the vulnerability 
Low 
The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, 
or controls are in place to prevent, or at least 
significantly impede, the vulnerability from being 
exercised. 
a.
 NIST likelihood determination categorization 
 
A similar way or rating vulnerabilities is used in Nessus, 
OpenVAS and NSE, the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System that assigns a CVSS score on each vulnerability that 
the scanner uses as a method to warn the user about the 
vulnerabilities that present the bigger risk and should be 
attended to first. 
 
Nessus sorts the vulnerabilities in the order of Critical, High, 
Medium and Low.  Each vulnerability is accompanied with 
Risk information that apart from the mentioned Risk Factor 
has a CVSS Base Score and CVSS temporal score. The 
difference with the temporal score is that it can change 
overtime based on factors like exploitability and remediation 
level. 
 
OpenVAS also uses the CVSS scoring system in a similar way 
to present and sort the vulnerability exploitability risk 
information. One difference with Nessus is the Risk Factors 
are High, Medium and Low.  
 
NSE provides with the same Risk Factor characterization 
(High, Medium and Low) in its reports and while it doesn’t 
provide with a CVSS score directly this information can be 
retrieved from the CVE link it provides. 
 
It should be noted that while these scores are indicative of how 
urgently a vulnerability should be looked at they don’t tell the 
whole story on the motivation of a threat-source to exploit this 
vulnerability but it makes sense that from the viewpoint of a 
threat-source highly exploitable vulnerabilities would be a 
priority when they are looking to harm the system. 
 
Step 6. Impact Analysis 
Determining the impact resulting from a successful threat 
exercise of a vulnerability is a major factor in measuring the 
level or risk. 
 
While the CVSS score can indicate the severity of a 
vulnerability being exploited in the system it doesn’t account 
for the importance and the sensitivity of the host or the data 
that could be affected and how this could impact the system’s 
mission and the organization overall. 
 
Impact can be assigned by the owners/managers based on 
three security goals: Loss of Integrity (information must be 
protected from improper modification), Loss of Availability (a 
system or information being unavailable to users could affect 
the operations of the organization), Loss of Confidentiality 
(protection from unauthorized disclosure of information). 
While sometimes impact can be directly translated to loss in 
revenue or cost of repairs other impacts can be easier qualified 
in terms of high, medium and low impacts (similarly to the 
Risk Factors) according to this table recommended by NIST. 
[2] 
TABLE III.  IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Magnitude 
of Impact Impact Definition  
High 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the highly 
costly loss of major tangible assets or resources (2) may 
significantly violate, harm or impede an organization’s 
mission, reputation or interest; or (3) may result in 
human death or serious injury 
Medium 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly 
loss of tangible assets or resources (2) may significantly 
violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, 
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human injury 
Low 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in loss of 
some tangible assets or resources or (2) may noticeably 
affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest. 
b.
 NIST impact analysis  recommendation 
Step 7. Risk Determination 
In order to assess the level of risk for a particular vulnerability 
a risk-level matrix can be developed by multiplying the ratings 
assigned for likelihood and impact of a threat that where 
determined in steps 5 and 6.  Assigning this ratings can be 
subjective but an in table IV we can see an example of a 3x3 
probability matrix provided by NIST. [2] 




Low (10) Medium(50) High(100) 
High (1.0) 10x1.0=10 50x10.0=50 100x1.0=100 
Medium (0.5) 10x0.5=5 50x0.5=25 100x0.5=50 
Low (0.1) 10x0.1=1 50x0.1=5 100x0.1=10 
a.
 Risk Scale : High (>50 to 100) Medium (>10 to 50) Low (1 to 10) 
 
Using this matrix each vulnerability can be assigned a Risk 
Level depending on the probability that it will be exploited 
and the negative impact that it would have on the system. 
These risk levels can be used to aid the decisions of managers 
in regards to how to act about each vulnerability like the 
example NIST recommendations shown in table V. 
TABLE V.  RISK DESCRIPTION AND NECESSARY ACTIONS 
Risk Level Risk Description and Necessary Actions  
High 
If an observation or finding is evaluated as high risk, 
there is a strong need for corrective measures. An 
existing system may continue to operate, but a 
corrective action plan must be put in place as soon as 
possible 
Medium 
If an observations is rated as medium risk, corrective 
actions are needed and a plan must be developed to 
incorporate these actions within a reasonable period of 
time. 
Low 
If an observation is described as low risk, the system’s 
DAA must determine whether corrective actions are 
still required or decide to accept the risk 
b.
 NIST recommendations for Risk descriptions and necessary actions 
 
Step 8. Control Recommendations 
The decision to minimize or eliminate risks is a management 
decision too. Because this process is usually associated with a 
cost whether it is financial, effort or operational impact the 
Risk Level is an important factor to decided which Risks 
should be eliminated and at which order.  
  
While the vulnerability scanners can’t help with the decision 
in regards to the cost the Risk Factor/ CVSS score does help 
directly to determine the overall vulnerability risk and most of 
the times they offer technical recommendations on how to 
eliminate this risk. 
 
Step 9. Results Determination 
The final step of Risk assessment is collecting all the 
information gathered by the previous steps and presenting 
them in a report in order to help the managers/owners make 
decisions.  
 
The basic structure of this report is not very different than the 
ones vulnerability scanners produce. There is still information 
about the system (hosts, services, interfaces and the addition of 
users and data), the vulnerabilities found are sorted by a risk 
factor (with the addition of impact in its calculation in a risk 
assessment) and a solution is proposed for each vulnerability 
in order to control it (in a risk assessment the solution could be 
do nothing if it is not cost effective). Where a risk assessment 
report differs is that instead of being aimed towards IT 
professionals it is presented in a way that managers can 
understand them and make decisions without being technically 
proficient themselves. 
 
VI. SCRIPTING CAPABILITIES 
Since all three vulnerability scanners we are examining offer 
the ability to create custom tests and reports using powerful 
scripting languages (NASL for Nessus and OpenVAS and 
LUA for NSE) it is worth examining the capabilities of these 
scripting languages to create custom scripts that receive 
external input, process it along with existing vulnerability 
scanning tests and produce a custom report that is 
understandable from non-technical managers following the 
steps of risk assessment described earlier. 
 
A. Nessus Attack Scripting Language (Nessus and OpenVAS) 
Nessus Attack Scripting Language (NASL) was developed for 
the Nessus security scanner and since OpenVAS branched out 
of the open source version of Nessus its scripts are built on 
NASL too.  
 
Each host is associated to an internal knowledge base, which 
contains all the information gathered by the tests during the 
scan. This enables the tests to exchange info and save time and 
resources. The fact that we can store our own values in the KB 
means that values like impact could be manually input, stored 
and shared between scripts as well. These values could be 
combined with internal variables on the custom scripts. The 
processing of results as well as the final presentation of the 
report can be customized in Nessus and OpenVAS using 
NASL scripts. If a cumulative report that combined all the 
tests reports was required (for example for our purposes to 
calculate a risk factor by multiplying probability with impact), 
the Knowledge Base could be used by a NASL script that 
retrieves information and combines them conditionally.  What 
makes the report string convenient to be used is the fact that it 
doesn’t have to be created all at once. Strings can be 
manipulated like in C for example where strings can be added 
in different order. So different functions of the script can 
create their own strings based on their own conditionals and 
results and those can be summed up in the end to form the 
report string in the desired order. 
 
A way to make feedback more specialized for each 
organization and useful to any manager could be achieved 
through Nessus or OpenVAS is by creating a superscript (a 
combination of NASL scripts) that combines the 
important/relevant tests for a system with info specific to the 
system or organization by the user to provide cumulative 
feedback about the security of the system in the form of a Risk 
Assessment. 
B.  Lua scripting language (NSE) 
NSE scripts are written in the embedded Lua programming 
language.  Being a part of Nmap adds a versatile and powerful 
library collection that allows easy interaction with most major 
network services and protocols and can use Nmap’s powerful 
and fast host and port scanning engine.  
 
The NSE “vulns” library that was developed in order to 
standardize vulnerability presentation and easy vulnerability 
management can be very useful in order to present a 
vulnerability report in a standardized way. Using the vulns 
library we can aggregate and report results across multiple 
hosts. This is done by saving vulnerabilities in nmap’s registry 
which is persistent across multiple host scans and later format 
this combined output as a postrule script which can then be 
further formatted.  
 
Where NSE could potentially edge out Nessus or OpenVAS in 
regards as being used as part of a Risk Assessment tool is the 
embeddability of Lua in other applications but the lack of 
vulnerability checks at this point makes it a less appropriate 
solution for a universal tool. 
VII. USING A VULNERABILITY SCANNER FOR RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
We identified in the previous sections that performing a Risk 
Assessment involves more data than what a vulnerability 
scanner usually can retrieve. This is in all cases data that 
cannot be retrieved automatically as it is more specific to each 




Fig. 5. Risk Assessment with a vulnerability scanner 
 As we can see in a simplified solution two additional functions 
to the scanner’s normal operations need to be performed (the 
calculation of risk and the compilation of the custom final 
report) as well as one important extra input to for the risk 
determination calculations which is the magnitude of impact 
associated with each host. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison 
is that all three of these vulnerability scanners can be suitable 
candidates for the purpose of creating a Risk Assessment tool. 
 
Had it remained free and open source Nessus would be the 
overall best choice due to its market dominance, available 
documentation and vulnerability database. OpenVAS can do 
most of what Nessus can and the real difference in 
vulnerability detection is not as big as the plugin numbers 
suggest as we examined earlier. NSE is very interesting due to 
the other features that come along with Nmap and its ability to 
penetration test as well as LUA being an overall more 
powerful scripting language as well as better documented than 
NASL. The limited vulnerability database makes it a poor 
choice for a tool that works on already existing scripts but it 
could be viable as a more personalized tool for a specific 
network. 
 
It is also definitely worth it to do further research on a stand-
alone risk assessment tool can work in collaboration with all 
these vulnerability scanners to collect data from their reports 
and even aggregate the results of different vulnerability 




[1] The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “An 
overview of Vulnerability Scanners”, 2008 
[2] Gary Stoneburner, Alice Goguen and Alexis Feringa “Risk Management 
Guide for Information Technology Systems”, Recommendations of the 
National Institude of Standards and Technology, NIST Special 
Publication 800-30, July 2002 
[3] Hannes Holm, Teodor Sommestad, Jonas Almroth, Mats Persson, (2011) 
"A quantitative evaluation of vulnerability scanning", Information 
Management & Computer Security, Vol. 19 Issue: 4, pp.231-247, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09685221111173058, 2011 
[4] Al-Ayed, A., Furnell, S.M., Zhao, D. and Dowland, P.S. (2005), “An 
automated framework formanaging security vulnerabilities”, Information 
Management & Computer Security, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 156-66. 
[5] Andress, M. (2004), “Network vulnerability assessment management”, 
Network World, November 8, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
